Translation, Biopolitics, Colonial Difference

Edited by
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

Traces, a multilingual book series of cultural theory and translation, calls for comparative cultural theory that is attentive to global traces in the theoretical knowledge produced in specific locations and that explores how theories are themselves constituted in, and transformed by, practical social relations at diverse sites. We eagerly seek theory produced in disparate sites, including that critical work that has often emerged in a hybrid relation to North American or West European "theory" as a result of the colonialism and quasi-colonialism of the past few centuries. We will publish research, exchanges, and commentaries that address a multilingual audience concerned with all the established disciplines of the social sciences and humanities, in addition to such cross-disciplinary fields as cultural studies, feminist and queer critical race theory, or post-colonial studies. At the same time, Traces aims to initiate a different circulation of intellectual conversation and debate in the world, a different geopolitical economy of theory and empirical data, and a different idea of theory itself.

Editions of Traces are published in Chinese, English, Japanese, and Korean. Each contributor is expected to be fully aware that she or he is writing for and addressing a heterogeneous and multilingual audience: in the manner of a local intellectual under a colonial regime, every contributor is expected to speak with a forked tongue. Traces is an international series. Yet the international space that it generates and sustains, and to which contributors as well as readers are invited, is fundamentally different from that of an internationalism based on one major language's subjugation of other minor languages. Indeed, it is hoped that the social space in which we argue and converse will challenge the space of the nation and national language. Constituted in processes of translation, among multiple languages and registers, this social space is actualized in our exchanges and debates, and in debates among authors, commentators, translators, and readers.
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to the shout of dictators who wish to capture for themselves the enunciation of the people.

NOTES

1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau. III, 4, fin.
3 Ibid., p. 186.
on the other hand, appears to have been used to some extent in contrast to “théologie” during the Renaissance period. During the secularization of knowledge in the nineteenth century, however, it came to designate a discipline that studies “human being” in an entirely different manner.

“Anthropos” and “humanitas,” to be certain, are not distinguished between in academic and general usage for practical reasons alone. People (in this case “European humans”) know how to employ the distinction between these two without being taught. For example, humans who possess “civilization” are “humanitas,” never “anthropos.” These two designations, moreover, are not selected according to the differing contexts of the same object, nor do they create a simple oppositional binary within a genre called human being. Rather, there exists an inextricable and fundamentally asymmetrical relation between the two. That asymmetry performs a systemic function related to the regime of modern “knowledge” itself (for that very reason, this distinction is made automatically whenever people speak “knowledgably”), a function that constitutes the “double standard” of modern human, or humanistic, knowledge. In other words, “anthropos” cannot escape the status of being the object of anthropological knowledge, while “humanitas” is never defined from without but rather expresses itself as the subject of all knowledge.

What is the asymmetrical nature of this relation?

“Anthropologie” denotes “the study of human being.” As is well known, however, the domain of the object of “anthropologie” is not so general. What we typically understand by this term — represented by the names Malinowski and Lévi-Strauss — is the study of the life, practices, and customs of a given human group; that is to say, it is the study of society and culture (there is, of course, also “anthropologie physique,” but more on that later). The emergence and development of this type of scholarship is well known. Although its establishment as an academic discipline came much later (late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), the motif of its knowledge reaches back to Columbus' time. That motif was born from Westerners’ travels into the unknown world and their encounters with human beings of different types. Westerners discovered the “New World,” conquered it, colonized it. As soon as the land and its inhabitants ceased to be a threat, Westerners began to take an interest in the strange customs and lives of the conquered, thus beginning to observe and record their “ecology.” This intellectual activity took place not only in the New World, but in Africa and the Asia-Pacific region as well, and it is this form of knowledge that has been generally referred to as “anthropologie.” In other words, the varieties of non-Western “human species” that came into the view of Westerners during the course of the modern period became an object of study referred to as “anthropos.”

For this reason, “anthropologie” does not concern itself with Western human beings in most cases. Westerners, particularly contemporary Europeans, have in general not become objects of “anthropologie” (this state of affairs has changed in recent years with attempts at the anthropology of the city and the anthropology of organizations). What does become the object of anthropological study is “ancient society,” as studied by Frazer and Reagan. Frazer's timeless study, The Golden Bough, attempts to illuminate ancient agricultural society by determining the significance of a mysterious episode in ancient Roman mythology. What this indicates is that Western society can become the object of “anthropologie,” but only in “antiquity,” i.e., before the West became the West; it can then appear as the “Other” to the gaze of modern knowledge. Put differently, “anthropologie” has always dealt with human beings that were the “Other” to European modernity. “Anthropologie,” in other words, made its object of study, first of all, the various mutations of humans Europe discovered outside of itself, and, second of all, what could be called the already lost self of modern Europeans located in the ancient past.

In sum, there are two categories of humans that serve as objects for “anthropologie.” One category includes extra-European humans and another includes ante-European humans. How, then, can these two categories both become the object of “anthropologie”? From what perspective can these two statuses — extra-European and ante-European — be deemed to be in common?

Since Columbus, Westerners have viewed novel “varieties of people” as “children” incapable of understanding Western social codes or norms. These are the “primitives,” and they cannot come to understand “civilization,” or if they can, they are “immature people” who must be “civilized.” In this manner, the difference between self and other is captured in terms of “backwardness” of realizing human “civilization.” The difference that became apparent in the geographic event called “encounter” — difference, of which there must have been alternative forms of acknowledgment — was taken into the perspective of historical time and translated into temporal terms.
The inhabitants in and around the land named “America” were initially interpreted according to the point of reference available at that time: the Greek code of “barbarian.” That interpretation was not historicist from the beginning, but the added layer of Christian interpretation — its perspective of salvation history — prepared the way for historicizing the position of the “barbarian.” Later, this interpretation was replaced by the “progress of civilization,” a vision of secular history that inaugurated the age of “Enlightenment.” The inhabitants were thus positioned as “those who are not yet civilized,” over and against the “civilized man” represented by Europeans. That is to say, they were relegated to the status of those who are “behind” on the ladder of “progress.” This historical vision of progress, moreover, was reinforced, and it gained “scientific” confirmation with Darwin’s theory of evolution.

What is referred to as “modernity,” which began with this “discovery” of difference, is not merely a historical time period but also a form of consciousness. It is a consciousness that positions itself as “new” while at the same time historicizing the “Other.” It possesses the ability to translate spatial difference into temporal difference. Thus, encountered difference is often interpreted as “backwardness” or “progress” according to a temporal measurement, and subsumed within a historical vision deemed universal. Under this regime of knowledge, difference encountered within the temporal order and difference encountered within the spatial order become commensurable. For this reason, the two “Others” — extra-Europe and ante-Europe — constitute the domain of knowledge called “anthropology” wherein they can both be treated as “anthropos.” This academic discipline is shaped within the limitations imposed by the regime of modern knowledge.

“Anthropologie,” as mentioned above, is not restricted to the social or cultural domains alone. What is called “anthropologie physique” (what in Japanese is called keishitsu jinruigaku, i.e. the anthropology of the body) studies the physical, morphological characteristics of human beings. This field is sometimes considered a branch of ethnologie in the broad sense, but its character is closer to “natural sciences” such as morphologie, physionomie, and phrenologie. Its interests and approach to the studied objects resembles histoire naturelle of the eighteenth century, i.e. the taxonomical study of flora and fauna. This type of “anthropologie” (anthropologie physique) has provided indexes with which the age of human bones exhumed by anthropologies can be determined. When biology came to be socially applied in the late nineteenth century, this anthropology also came to be used to connect bodily or facial features to specific personalities (applied in criminology), or to determine the law-like identity of human beings. It belongs to the discipline of anthropometry.

These two “anthropologies” which are now captured under the rubric of ethnology were, in fact, formed within different contexts. One (anthropologie) was produced out of the interest and curiosity Westerners developed towards those with customs and habits entirely different from their own, those who were “of the same kind,” but remained clearly “different.” The other (anthropologie physique), however, emerged from the taxonomical interest in observing and recording the physical conditions of individual human beings within Western society. Its knowledge, therefore, did not develop in response to the distinction between the “inside and outside” of the West, but rather in response to the other distinction between “self and other” within West: the distinction between “spirit and body.” In this sense, anthropologie physique developed by observing the body as matter in nature, as in the cases of physiology and anatomy. Still, these two “anthropologies” gazes do overlap. The Westerner, confronting the “anthropos,” treats the object just as a naturalist would treat a specimen of natural history. The customs of the human beings in the field are for the anthropologist, the flora and fauna of the naturalist. “Physionomie,” moreover, helps physically determine the difference of the “Other.” In this manner, the two branches of “anthropologie” — regardless of what they originally pursued — can be harmonized without conflict to the extent that they maintain the scholarly posture of framing the “Other” as an object of cognition. Physical dimensions as well as cultural and social dimensions, supplement each other in forming the object of anthropological knowledge.

Both forms of anthropologie — cultural and physical — place human beings, be they individuals or groups, within the observable category of “anthropos.” Moreover, the self-evident fact remains (so self-evident, in fact, that it attracts no attention) that this cognition is always Western. The cognition of the world (or human beings) is neither objective nor universal. This is so because this cognition is oriented, in principle, from the perspective of the West (l’Occident). Within the European languages, the word to orient (orienter) overlaps with the word for the East (Orient). To orient also means to “direct,” and, like a vector sign, a function of power is contained in that act. Knowledge that is now generalized is “directed.”
from the universalizing West to the rest. I will avoid wading too deeply into this “directional determination” of the awareness we have of the world, and the accompanying problem of the centralization of the West, problems that today have seriously lost their bearings.

Who, then, establishes “anthropos” as the object of cognition? Who, in this situation, occupies the space of subject? How can we categorize this subject of cognition? And to whom does this cognition belong? The answer is none other than “humanitas” in the dual sense of the word. Dual, in the sense that the word points to human beings themselves as well as the knowledge they possess. Signifying “human nature” as opposed to “divinitas,” this word came to designate classicism, the study of Greco-Roman texts that propelled the Renaissance from the fourteenth century onwards. Why was this form of scholarship called “humanitas”? Because this study was the pursuit of human knowledge by humans, no longer relying on God or religion (Christianity).

Ancient Greece became an exemplar because the Greeks did not rely on a mythical explanation of the world, but attempted to rationally explain human beings and the world they live in by employing human intellect and understanding. As is often repeated, they sought to make human beings the measure of all things. Later, however, this consistent principle of explanation was subsumed by the will of the single God who created the world, and Christianity monopolized the framework through which a wide array of people explained the world for over a millennium. Against this regime of knowledge which was subsumed by the will of the single God who created the world, and Christianity monopolized the framework through which a wide array of people explained the world for over a millennium. Against this regime of knowledge, the people of the Renaissance discovered an example of free knowledge in antiquity. For this reason, there existed in Classicism a will towards a knowledge centered on human beings. The pursuit of knowledge guided by human reason was, at the same time, the pursuit of human possibility and of human essence itself. In a sense, it was an adventure to search for what human beings were and could become, an expression of the will to illustrate human nature through knowledge. All of this is condensed within the word “humanitas.” “Humanitas” possesses the dual meaning of the independent pursuit of knowledge by human beings released from religious restraints and human nature expressed through that pursuit.

“Humanitas” (humanism) thus studies “humanitas” (human being). “Humanitas” can therefore also be the object of knowledge. However, in this case the object of knowledge is not natural or physical human being, but rather the knowing subject itself.

In other words, “humanitas” is the knowledge of the knowing subject, and in that sense is knowledge based on the subject's self-reflection; that which knows and that which is known are both the subject. This human being as subject observes what itself is and how itself acts, moving from self to self, achieving expression of itself for itself. In sum, “humanitas” is the self-understanding of human being as a subject. This self-referential form of knowledge clearly expresses the character of human cognition called “humanitas,” especially its independence and self-sufficiency released from the authority of God and the explanatory logic founded upon God.

In this manner, “humanitas” gains significance as an intellectual activity in pursuit of the universal essence of that which is human. It is the answer to the single question: “what is a human being?” And the pursuit itself of that answer takes place as the creation of that which is essentially human. If human beings are knowing beings, “humanitas” is the pursuit and realization of “humanitas” by “humanitas.” The coincidence of the subject that gives birth to knowledge, the object of that knowledge, and the knowledge given birth to, cannot but evoke the expression “Trinitarian” in spite of the escape from divine authority. This Trinitarian coincidence achieves complete expression, following the age of Enlightenment thought, in Hegel's philosophy.

Hegel's philosophy, specifically its concept of absolute knowledge, is composed around “self-awareness (self-knowledge).” Hegel, who struggled to unify knowledge and existence, subject and object, theorized this unity through the dialectical logic of the subject that realizes itself fully in the positing of empirical knowledge. For this reason, he stresses the subjective formation of knowledge. In other words, knowledge is the act of knowing and, at the same time, what is produced by the act, the substance of knowledge. This latter form of knowledge is not merely some unchanging wisdom, but is made concrete in discourse; it is conceptually grasped reality (existence). Reality carries no meaning unless it is conceptually grasped in this manner, and the only reality worth pondering is that which is posited by knowledge. This is what is expressed in the formula “what is real is rational, what is rational is real.”

Hegel understood this knowledge as the self-formation or self-realization of Geist. He first characterizes consciousness in terms of its “negativity.”
Consciousness, which emerges from the darkness of nature, confronts the world as nothingness, and in confronting it, negates it. By negating the world, consciousness turns it into an object to be assimilated into understanding and expressed as knowledge. At the same time, consciousness realizes itself within this knowledge, knowledge that is at once subjective and objective. Through this process, the essence of human being that was at first only “negativity,” comes to be realized through empirical knowledge. At the end of numerous repetitions of this process, negativity shows itself as a fully realized Geist. This Geist is none other than the spirit of the world realized by the labors of human consciousness. Furthermore, what is expressing itself in this Geist is a totally humanized world that is grasped by human beings and engulfed into their possibilities. In this way the trinity of knowledge — subject, object, and self-awareness — completes its circuit.

In creating an immanent totality, this philosophy no longer requires transcendent judgment or an outside. For this very reason, whether this philosophy was atheistic or not became the subject of debate. Feuerbach, Hegel’s disciple, was able to describe this philosophy as the expression of a human spirit that no longer required God as its basis; he called it the study of human being: “anthropologie.” Here too, “anthropologie” appears. Within the context of philosophy, however, it remains set against “theologie,” and in spite of Feuerbach’s unintentional declaration, spirit (knowledge) as the realization of human essence by human beings is, in fact, the essential characteristic of “humanitas” under consideration here.

The foregoing are the two separate concepts Western knowledge employs concerning human being. The difference between “humanitas” and “anthropos” is not merely of categories, but rather corresponds to their differing relations within the operation of knowledge. Put simply, people are “humanitas” so long as they relate to knowledge subjectively, while those who remain the object of that knowledge are “anthropos.” “Humanitas” produces knowledge and enriches it by possessing that knowledge. “Anthropos,” therefore, designates the position of the object that is absorbed into the domain of knowledge produced by “humanitas.”

This relationship does not pertain to the operation of knowledge alone, however. Or rather, knowledge operates beyond the level of cognition. To “know,” as Hegel’s use of the term “Herrschaft” clearly indicates, is to establish the relationship between subject and object. Grasping and defining something as an object is, literally, to capture it and, furthermore, to gain the ability to manipulate it. It is already an operation of power. Within this relationship, the subject is active while the object can only passively accept that activity. Moreover, to grant something the status of object is to assimilate it into the subject’s world of cognition, granting it the right to exist there. Things can exist if they are left alone, but in order for them to be recognized as actually existing, they must gain the position of object within the subject’s gaze. Otherwise, they cannot exist meaningfully within the “human world” defined by “humanitas.” “Anthropos” precisely this existence that is only recognized as an object within “humanitas” or its domain of knowledge.

For Western knowledge, i.e., for “humanitas,” the “varieties of people” it encounters unavoidably appear as “anthropos.” That relationship remains unchanged from the time when Europeans first encountered the inhabitants of the discovered new world. Europeans came to call that land “America” in memory of an explorer’s “accomplishment,” but what the original inhabitants called the land was of no significance to them. Ignoring such names, they named the land “America” and took possession of that vast land and its surrounding regions. They described and managed the world according to their conventions alone. In other words, a “new world” was defined, and along with it a discourse to describe it; the world that preceded it was relegated to the realm of “nonexistence” by this act of definition. Ever since, the world can only speak of this place as “America.” This is how unknown worlds, alien worlds are assimilated into the domain of “humanitas.” What was accomplished with the naming of “America” may thus be called the prototype of “humanitas” ever-expanding act of self-definition.

The debate that took place in mid-sixteenth century in Valladolid, Spain between the Dominican missionary Las Casas and the renowned Aristotelian of the day, Sepúlveda indicates that the definition of “humanitas” did indeed take place at this time. Westerners, as the subject of knowledge, debated seriously at this time whether or not the “humanity” of the “red skinned” beings they encountered should be recognized. In other words, they debated whether they would be “humanitas” or not. What was actually debated under the authority of Pope was whether or not these beings could become Christians, whether they could understand the gospel. Given the absence of biological and racial
conceptions of humanity at the time, it amounts to the same difference. As is well
known, Las Casas is considered a forerunner of moral “humanism,” and
Sepúlveda was also a first rate classicist, i.e. a “humanist” of his day. In any case,
members of “humanitas” argued over its boundaries, as the owner and judge of
knowledge concerning itself. In that space, the “red skinned” people were placed
beneath even the “barbaroi,” those who do not possess words with which to
speak of themselves.

They were bestowed the status of “primitives.” Ever since, the relationship
has been formalized between humans who possess knowledge and humans
who receive the determination of that knowledge and are captured within its
rule. This asymmetrical relation between “humanitas” and “anthropos” is being
continually reproduced: the former as the owner of knowledge, the latter as the
owned object of knowledge and as a manipulated object to be folded into the
domain of knowledge. True, it is not as though “anthropos” did not retain its
own records, its own knowledge. The Mayans and Aztecs who survived the
conquest have recorded the faint traces of their survival, their myths, legends,
and customs in several written texts. They did not, however, preserve them in
their own language. The texts are written in the Spanish language they were
taught by the Spanish missionaries along with Christianity. In essence, the traces
of their survival are communicated in the language of “humanitas.” The
“anthropos” were able to preserve their “knowledge” because they learned the
language of “humanitas.” In other words, they had to become “humanitas” to
some extent in order to leave a trace in the domain of knowledge. The knowledge
that is produced in this manner is preserved as yet another possession of
“humanitas.”

This structure remains basically unchanged to this day. In general, to gain
knowledge (scientific, academic) in the various non-Western regions means, above
all else, to study Western knowledge and its methods. Of course, “knowledge”
exists anywhere, but that kind of “knowledge” only speaks regionally. Put another
way, it cannot be “universal” because the form of knowledge operative in the
world today has, basically, spread from the West. The modern education system
itself, along with the content it teaches, was imported from the West. The
disciplinaryws that constitute the university are formed within frameworks developed
in the West during the nineteenth century. To put on knowledge said to be
universal, to make it one’s own, or to assimilate into that knowledge, therefore,

signifies “anthropos” approaching “humanitas” and assimilating itself. It means
moving from a mere receiver of knowledge to a possessor of universal knowledge,
and even a producer.

Modern knowledge has accumulated in this manner. Of course, we can all
receive this knowledge in principle, non-Westerners included. However, in what
fashion? For example, those who are fortunate in former colonies study Western
languages at their former colonizer, thus forming themselves as subjects of
knowledge. That means escaping the station of “anthropos” and becoming a
subject who possesses and produces knowledge, i.e. “humanitas.” We might
call this process “humanization.” Those “anthropos” who become “humanitas”
through this process, however, no longer behave as “anthropos.” Those who
were “humanized” in this fashion under colonial rule were often the most loyal
servants of the colonial regime; a common point made by Franz Fanon and Aimé
Césaire.

In any case, “humanitas” is neither closed nor exclusionary; it is rather gracious
and open, capable of encompassing all. Because of this, all human beings can
approach the types of knowledge designated “humanitas.” And for this very reason,
as “humanitas” became “universal” knowledge in conjunction with the
globalization of West, it was established as the “standard” of global knowledge.
Now, all scholarly knowledge is basically the embodiment of “humanitas,” and
as the general knowledge concerning human being and its world, “humanitas”
functions as the standard in all domains.

The “universality” of that knowledge is guaranteed, however, only so long as
“anthropos” accepts it and transforms itself into “humanitas.” Only by doing so
does the “semi-humanitas” expand and this knowledge become a form of knowledge
applicable to and acceptable by all human beings. If, however, the natural
consequence of “civilization” is for all “anthropos” to become “humanitas,” and
to do so is deemed the liberation of “anthropos” from a passive position to become
a yielder of universal knowledge, then the effect of “humanitas” upon “anthropos”
will always contain a one-sided “self-righteousness.” This will be the case so long
as “humanisation” is assumed to be the “natural” result of civilization. The problem
of people who were oppressed and whose languages were robbed as a result of the
dominating desire of knowledge arises from this fact. This is also where the question
of “whether the subaltern can speak,” discussed in historical research and
anthropology in recent years, arises.
Nishitani Osamu

In today's world, where the movement of Western globalization has been completed, those who were once only "anthropos," whether they like it or not, must now become "humanitas" to a greater or lesser extent (we might call it "humanization") if they are to speak of the world or of human being. The "humanized" former "anthropos," however, do not constitute a self-identical "humanitas" that chose to define itself. Intended or not, they introduce non-identity into the world of "humanitas." This does not indicate a flaw in "humanitas," but rather is a change of "humanitas" itself brought about by its globalization. The now global "knowledge of human being" universally contains within itself this non-identity. Only the self-identical "humanitas" refuses to acknowledge this. The self-identity of "humanity" is something that is formed, and this process of formation itself, it is believed, must be maintained; this self-identity cannot stop the movement of subsuming difference and totalizing itself.

What is necessary for knowledge today is not for all to become "humanitas" through and through and expand the recognition of "humanitas" as the self-evident horizon of "universal knowledge." What is called for instead is rendering "humanitas," which insists upon its "universality," an object of "anthropologique" consideration as one version of "anthropos." We will be unable to liberate knowledge regarding human being from its unilateral and oppressive structure unless we clarify the kinds of structures and restraints it places upon our "knowledge."

The unilateral relationship between "humanitas" and "anthropos" determines not only the general regime of knowledge, but also, the deeper way in which those Westerners who unquestioningly identify themselves with "humanitas" view the world. The discourse of "liberation" or "democratization" advocated by the political leaders of the United States of America today is perhaps the most extreme example. "Freedom" and "democracy" are indeed concepts that have developed to express the most important values within the discourse of "humanitas." Does that mean, however, that people must first enter the domain of "humanitas" in order to approach those ideals? If "humanitas" is a regime of "universal" knowledge, and if "humanitas" ostensibly encompasses all human beings, discourses that seek to forcibly "liberate" and "democratize" people would not emerge. As the "Council of Valladolid" clearly indicates, "humanitas" distinguishes between what is "humanitas" and what is not, and by nullifying the excluded half, the regime of "humanitas" establishes itself upon that "nothingness." Put differently, "humanitas" is itself an idea, but it also functions as a regime that is a subject and activity that realizes that idea. It functions, in other words, as a ceaseless "humanization." Moreover, only what this "humanitas" brings about is deemed true "freedom" and "democracy."

For those who are "humanized" by this "liberty," however, they can only be "free" with the accompanying theft of language and the oppression or erasure of self, just as the Aztec survivors could only leave behind records in Spanish. But for "humanitas," what is being erased is precisely the source of "unhappiness" for these people, the negative circumstances of the "anthropos" that must be given up and overcome in order to become more like "humanitas." They therefore insist that it is the natural "right" and "duty" of "humanitas" to "liberate" these people, even by force.

I will not rehearse here what is daily taking place in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, the "Council of Valladolid" which once debated the principles of creating and administering an "American world" is clearly taking place again today, including the fact that the rights and interests of the colonizers are involved. The original representatives of "humanitas," the "human race" of "old Europe," have learned through the difficult experience of dealing with the end of colonial rule (i.e., anti-colonial conflicts and their aftermath, along with the colony-less reorganization of domestic affairs) that the relationship between "humanitas" and "anthropos" cannot be simply one-sided. That experience underlies the so-called "oldness" of Europe. But, so long as the "new" humanitas that settled the "virginal land" affirms the regime called "America" that it created, this "new" humanitas will pursue the nullification and "humanization" of "anthropos" as the natural task appointed to itself. "Humanitas" gave the name "America" to the "New World"; it now behaves as though it believes without a shadow of doubt that "America" is the name for the "New World" that must be remade. It thus seeks to place the entire world beneath this name.

Those who do not doubt that they are "humanitas," the "universal human beings," view themselves as the possessors of civilization, justice, of universal values. They believe that they possess the right to spread their own "justice" and "arbitrariness" the world over. To be more specific, they do not "believe" this; if "rights" are produced by "power" alone, as a question of sheer "power" beyond all questions of thought and conviction, they employ that "power." They label those who do not submit to that power "rogues," and "evil ones,"
using the threat of “evil” as an excuse to further strengthen and demonstrate that “power.” Therefore, even nuclear weapons are used because although they are the flowers of civilization for “humanitas,” once in the hands of “anthropos” they become “evil weapons of destruction” that threaten civilization. If nuclear weapons are to be used, however, as they once did, to “liberate” and “democratize” “anthropos,” they will demonstrate their essence as “tools of civilization.” Effective bombing employing the best of technology does not kill human beings, it destroys the cages of “anthropos,” bestowing upon them the virtuous accomplishments of humanitas. In this way, the forcible rule of a “humanitas” infused with “power” is established. That rule of “power” (or more clearly, that rule of “terror”), however, may be a space of “freedom” so long as one assimilates the etiquette decorum of “humanitas,” just as the “anthropos” who assimilated themselves to “humanitas” under colonial rule.

This “rule of terror,” or the “terror of freedom,” is merely an absurd nightmare today. Unless we seriously question the knowledge and self-sufficient existence of “humanitas,” it will become the reality of tomorrow. What will help us dismantle this self-sufficiency is not “humanitas” or “divinitas,” but rather, as already mentioned, an “anthropologique” gaze that will closely observe “humanitas” as one version of “anthropos.” “Anthropos” is not a candidate for promotion to “humanitas”; it is the term for human beings placed under the gaze of relationship of reciprocity. We must now mirror the position of “anthropos” back to “humanitas.” In spite of “humanitas” establishing itself with “anthropos” as its mirror, its current representatives have forgotten this, idealizing a world without “mirrors,” and thus seek to destroy all “mirrors.” Who cannot see the madness of such behavior?

Notes
1 This essay is a revised version of a talk given on 10 March 2003 at the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme — Ange Guepin in Nantes, France. That talk was based upon an essay entitled “European “Human Being” and “Human Race”: Anthropos and Humanitas” (Yoroppateki ‘ningen’ to ‘jinrui’ — antoroposu to humanitasu) in Definitions of the Twentieth Century, vol. 4 The Century of Border Crossings and Refugees [Nijusseiki no teigi 4 ekyo to nanmin no seiki] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2001), 35–38.
2 For purposes of convenience, all subsequent references to Western terms of “humanité” and “anthropologie” will be in French.